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ABSTRACT: 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam articulated a notion of relativized apriority that 
was motivated to address the problem of scientific change. This paper examines 
Putnam’s account in its historical context and in relation to contemporary views. I begin 
by locating Putnam’s analysis in the historical context of Quine’s rejection of apriority, 
presenting Putnam as a sympathetic commentator on Quine. Subsequently, I explicate 
Putnam’s positive account of apriority, focusing on his analysis of the history of physics 
and geometry. In the remainder of the paper, I explore connections between Putnam’s 
account of relativized a priori principles and contemporary views. In particular, I situate 
Putnam’s account in relation to analyses advanced by Michael Friedman, David Stump, 
and William Wimsatt. From this comparison, I address issues concerning whether a 
priori scientific principles are appropriately characterized as “constitutive” or 
“entrenched”. I argue that these two features need to be clearly distinguished, and that 
only the constitutive function is essential to apriority. By way of conclusion, I explore the 





In a series of papers in the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam (1962b, 1962a, 1976, 1979a) 
articulated an account of apriority that was motivated to address the problem of scientific 
change. Specifically, Putnam’s analysis aimed to explain the special epistemological 
status that particular parts of scientific knowledge possess (or once possessed), while 
accommodating the putative occurrence of ‘scientific revolutions’. In addressing this 
issue, Putnam argues that in the context of a body of physical knowledge, there are 
certain statements (e.g., ‘f = ma’, ‘e = ½ mv²’, the laws of Euclidean geometry) – what 
Putnam calls “framework principles” – that possess a privileged status. According to 
Putnam, these principles have an a priori or necessary status relative to a particular body 
of knowledge (e.g., 18th century physics). 
 This paper examines Putnam’s analysis of analyticity and apriority, both in its 
historical context and in relation to contemporary views. The paper proceeds as follows. 
In the first section, I locate Putnam’s account in the historical context of Quine’s (1951) 
criticism of analyticity, and present his account of apriority as a response to Quine. 
Subsequently, I explicate the main features of Putnam’s positive account of apriority, 
focusing on his analysis of the history of physics and geometry. In the second half of the 
paper, I explore connections between Putnam’s account of apriority and contemporary 
views. In particular, I situate Putnam’s analysis in relation to recent analyses by Michael 
Friedman, David Stump, and William Wimsatt. From this comparison, I explore and 
address some issues concerning whether a priori scientific principles are appropriately 
characterized as “constitutive” (in a Reichenbachian sense) or “entrenched” (in a Quinean 
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sense). I argue that these two features need to be clearly distinguished, and that only the 
former represents an essential feature of a priori scientific principles.  
 
2. Putnam as a Commentator on Quine 
Putnam’s account of analyticity and apriority is formulated primarily in response to 
Quine’s (1951) analysis in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (cf. Ebbs, 1997, ch. 6). In 
“Two Dogmas Revisited”, Putnam (1976) reconstructs one of Quine’s arguments against 
analyticity as a significant and cogent argument against the existence of a priori truths, 
i.e., statements that are true in all possible worlds or “immune from revision”. In a well-
known passage from “Two Dogmas”, Quine writes: 
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs . . . is a man made fabric which 
impinges on experience only along the edges . . . total science is like a field of 
force whose boundary conditions are experience. . . . But the total field is so 
underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much 
latitude of choice as to what statements to reëvaluate in the light of any single 
contrary experience. . . . If this view is right, it is misleading to speak of the 
empirical content of an individual statement . . . Furthermore, it becomes folly to 
seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on 
experience, and analytic statements, which hold come what may. Any statement 
can be held true come what may if we make drastic enough adjustments 
elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very close to the periphery can be held 
true in the face of recalcitrant experience by pleading hallucination or by 
amending certain statements of the kind called logical laws. Conversely, by the 
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same token, no statement is immune to revision. Revision of even the logical law 
of the excluded middle has been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum 
mechanics; and what difference is there in principle between such a shift and the 
shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin 
Aristotle? (Quine, 1951, pp. 42-3, emphasis added) 
Here, Quine articulates his holistic version of empiricism as an alternative to “dogmatic 
empiricism”. As indicated by the last sentence of this passage, Quine believes that 
reflection on the history of science and scientific practices presents reasons for doubting 
the existence of unrevisable statements.1 
 Putnam reconceives Quine’s argument as a “historical argument” against 
apriority. Specifically, Putnam (1976) emphasizes three points in the passage just cited 
(pp. 90-1). First, Quine’s reference to the history of science is meant to highlight the fact 
that scientific principles that were once thought to be true for all times were eventually 
abandoned or revised. This is, arguably, Quine’s strongest argument against apriority, 
and it can be understood as a pessimistic meta-induction against the existence of 
unrevisable truths. Implicit in Quine’s argument is the assumption that there is no better 
standard for the epistemologist to adopt than the standards adopted by practicing 
scientists. As such, Quine recommends fallibilism with respect to truth. Second, in 
referring to non-standard logics and quantum mechanics, Quine suggests that fallibilism 
should to extend to logical laws. As Putnam puts it:  
                                                 
1 Another perspective on this aspect of Quine’s argument is that Quine presents an argument against the 
existence of “necessary truths”, as opposed to “contingent truths”. Since “revisability” is the issue that 
Putnam identifies as crucial, I think that contingency is what Putnam regards as correct in Quine’s analysis. 
On this reading, Quine’s argument can be viewed as an attack on the distinction between necessary and 
contingent truths, and Quine’s position is that all statements should be regarded as having a contingent 
status. 
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[Quine] is saying that proposals to use non-standard logics in quantum mechanics 
cannot be ruled out by any legitimate principle of scientific method. He is saying 
that the fallibilism which Peirce recognized as contributing essentially to the 
success of modern science extends also to the laws of logic. He is not just making 
a sociological remark to the effect that some scientists . . . are willing to consider 
revision of logical laws . . . He clearly thinks that it is right, fitting, and proper 
that they should be willing to allow such a possibility. . . . If this is right, then the 
laws of logic are not principles that a rational man is forbidden to revise. They are 
not clear and distinct ideas. They are not a priori truths. (Putnam, 1976, pp. 90-1, 
emphasis added) 
Here, Putnam emphasizes that Quine’s argument against apriority works by placing 
beliefs before the standards of actual scientific practices. On this reading, Quine is 
arguing that the notion of a priori truth is simply inconsistent with the fallibilist attitude 
characteristic of science. Third, Quine maintains that the proposal to use non-standard 
logic in quantum mechanics is not fundamentally different from the proposal to use non-
Euclidean geometry in the theory of space-time. Taken together, Putnam understands 
Quine’s argument to have shown that the history of science has no room for the notion of 
a priori truth as unrevisable truth. 
The lesson to be drawn from Quine’s “historical argument”, Putnam (1976) 
contends, is that “some statements can only be overthrown by rival theory; but there is no 
such thing as an absolutely unrevisable statement” (p. 94, emphasis in original). 
Conformably, Putnam rejects an absolutist notion of apriority. Putnam writes:  
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The concept of an a priori truth that I reject is historically best represented by 
Descartes’ notion of a clear and distinct idea. Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas 
were in a certain sense self-certifying truths. They bore their validity on their face. 
Not only could it never be rational to give up such a truth; it could never be 
rational to doubt one. (Putnam, 1979b, p. viii)  
Putnam believes that this traditional notion of a priori truth, i.e., necessary truths that no 
rational person would deny (e.g., ‘1+1 = 2’ or ‘The sum of the interior angles of any 
triangle is 180 degrees’) has been decisively undermined by Quine’s analysis. Putnam 
goes as far as suggesting that Quine’s argument is of great philosophical significance, and 
that Quine should be credited with disabusing philosophers of this traditional notion of 
apriority. Putnam writes: 
Quine . . . considers . . . the notion of analytic truth as one that is confirmed no 
matter what. I . . . contend that this is the traditional notion of apriority, or rather, 
one of the traditional notions of apriority. This notion, or variants thereof, has 
played a central role in all of philosophy since the ancients, and in all the different 
branches of philosophy. Moreover, I think that Quine’s attack on this notion was 
correct. . . . If I am right, Quine is a philosopher of historic importance . . . 
because he was the first philosopher of the top rank . . . to reject the notion of 
apriority. . . [I]f I am wrong and there is such a thing as a priori truth, then I am 
doubtless overestimating Quine’s importance in the history of philosophy. There 
are some philosophers in the history of philosophy whose importance does not 
very much depend on their being right. But Quine’s importance does, I think, 
depend to a large measure upon his being right in one central claim, a claim which 
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he expressed by saying that there is no sensible distinction between analytic and 
synthetic truths but which he should have expressed by saying that there is no 
sensible distinction between a priori and a posteriori truths. (Putnam, 1976, pp. 
87-8, emphasis in original) 
Leaving aside issues regarding Putnam’s assessment of Quine’s importance, I want to 
highlight Putnam’s endorsement of Quine’s rejection of apriority as the appropriate 
background for understanding Putnam’s positive account of analyticity and apriority. 
  
3. The Analytic and the Synthetic 
Although the starting point for Putnam’s analysis is a Quinean rejection of apriority, 
Putnam (contra-Quine) does not reject the analytic-synthetic distinction – or the a priori-
a posteriori – distinction entirely. Putnam’s position can be understood as rejecting an 
analytic-synthetic dichotomy, but affirming an analytic-synthetic distinction (cf. Putnam, 
1994a, p. 249). In the following section, I outline Putnam’s positive account of the 
analytic-synthetic distinction, focusing on his analysis of the history of physics and 
geometry. Although I follow Putnam’s (1962b) terminology in presenting his account as 
an account of the analytic-synthetic distinction, it should be recognized—given Putnam’s 
understanding of Quine—that the a priori-a posteriori distinction is, arguably, the main 
target of his analysis. 
In “The Analytic and the Synthetic”, Putnam (1962b) aims to articulate a positive 
account of the analytic-synthetic distinction “both inside and outside of physical theory” 
(p. 33). Putnam is concerned with an analytic-synthetic distinction in natural languages 
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and, following Quine, he maintains that the analytic-synthetic distinction is a distinction 
of degree, not of kind. Putnam writes: 
[O]n the whole my story will resemble Quine’s. That is to say, I believe that we 
have a conceptual system with centralities and priorities. I think that the 
statements in that conceptual system – except for the trivial examples of 
analyticity, e.g., ‘All bachelors are unmarried’, ‘All vixens are foxes’ – fall on a 
continuum, a multi-dimensional continuum. More or less stipulation enters; more 
or less systematic import. But any one of these principles might be given up . . . 
With Quine, I should like to stress the monolithic character of our conceptual 
system, the idea of our conceptual system as a massive alliance of beliefs which 
face the tribunal of experience collectively and not individually, the idea that 
‘when trouble strikes’ revisions can with a very few exceptions, come anywhere. 
(Putnam, 1962b, p. 40, emphasis added) 
Here, Putnam characterizes the general feature of “analytic” statements as statements that 
involve a greater degree of “stipulation”.2 Moreover, by speaking of analytic statements 
in terms of “centralities” and “priorities”, his account purports to distinguish these 
statements in terms of the epistemic reasons that we have for believing them. Finally, 
Putnam’s account distinguishes between “trivial” analytic statements such as ‘all 
bachelors are unmarried’, and analytic statements in science (see Putnam, 1962b, pp. 50-
69; Ebbs, 1997, pp. 163-4). The focus of this paper will be on the latter. 
Putnam articulates his account of analyticity with reference to cases of theory 
change in science. For instance, consider the definition of kinetic energy before and after 
                                                 
2 Although Putnam characterizes analytic principles in science – on a general level – as “stipulated 
definitions”, he opposes conventionalist perspectives on these principles (e.g., see Putnam 1975, ch. 9). 
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Einstein. In pre-relativistic physics, the statement ‘e = ½ mv²’ was the definition of 
kinetic energy in the sense that ‘kinetic energy’ was regarded as a short-hand 
abbreviation for ‘one-half mass times velocity squared’. However, in the context of the 
special theory of relativity, Einstein required that physical laws (e.g., the law of 
gravitation) be Lorentz-invariant, i.e., physical laws must remain unchanged by a Lorentz 
transformation. In accordance with this principle, Einstein replaced the definition of 
‘kinetic energy’ with a more complicated law (viz., ‘e = mc2 + ½ mv². . .’ when expanded 
as a power-series). For Putnam, this case of theory change highlights the peculiar status 
that ‘e = ½ mv²’ possessed in the historical context of pre-relativistic physics. In this 
context, ‘e = ½ mv²’ was regarded as immune from revision in the precise sense that it 
served as a necessary presupposition for framing empirical experiments. Putnam writes: 
The principle ‘e = ½ mv²’ may have been introduced . . . by stipulation; the 
Newtonian law of gravitation may have been introduced on the basis of induction 
from the behavior of the known satellite system and the solar system (as Newton 
claimed); but in subsequent developments these two famous formulas were to 
figure on a par. Both were used in innumerable physical experiments until they 
were challenged by Einstein, without ever being regarded as themselves subject to 
test in the particular experiment. If a physicist makes a calculation and gets an 
empirically wrong answer, he does not suspect that the mathematical principles 
used in the calculation may have been wrong . . . nor does he suspect that the law 
‘f = ma’ may be wrong. Similarly, he did not frequently suspect before Einstein 
that the law ‘e = ½ mv²’ might be wrong or that the Newtonian gravitational law 
might be wrong. . . . These statements, then, have a kind of preferred status. They 
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can be overthrown only if someone incorporates principles incompatible with 
those statements in a successful conceptual system. (Putnam, 1962b, pp. 45-46, 
emphasis added) 
For Putnam, the status of principles such as ‘e = ½ mv²’ are analytic in the sense that in 
the context of pre-relativistic physics no single experiment could ever overthrow such 
principles; these principles need to be presupposed in order to frame empirically 
meaningful experiments. In this precise sense, the kinetic definition of energy and 
Newton’s law of gravitation possessed a necessary or quasi-necessary status in the 
context of pre-relativistic physics. 
 Putnam reaches similar conclusions on the status of Euclidean geometry. Putnam 
(1962b) states that before the work of Riemann, Lobachevski, and others in the 19th 
century – that would subsequently lead to the overthrow of Euclidean geometry – “the 
principles of Euclidean geometry were as close to analytic as any nonanalytic statement 
ever gets”, in the sense that “no experiment that one could describe could possibly 
overthrow them” (p. 48). However, after the development of the special theory of 
relativity and non-Euclidean geometry, scientists were given reasons to revise Euclidean 
geometry.  
Putnam summarizes his analysis of the history of physics and geometry by calling 
principles such as ‘e = ½ mv²’, ‘f = ma’, and the principles of Euclidean geometry 
‘framework principles’. According to Putnam: 
‘[F]ramework principles’ . . . have the characteristic of being so central that they 
are employed as auxiliaries to make predictions in an overwhelming number of 
experiments, without themselves being jeopardized by any possible experimental 
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results. This is the classical role of the laws of logic; but it is equally the role of 
certain physical principles, e.g., ‘f = ma,’ . . . the laws of Euclidean geometry, and 
the law ‘e = ½ mv²’, at the time when those laws were still accepted. (Putnam, 
1962b, pp. 48-9, emphasis added) 
As indicated here, framework principles, for Putnam, possess three key characteristics: 
(1) they serve as necessary presuppositions for various experiments, (2) they are 
regarded as a priori, and are themselves immune from physical testing, and (3) their 
revision or abandonment often requires the development of an entirely new conceptual 
scheme. 
 
3. Framework Principles and the Contextual A Priori 
Putnam affirms the existence of principles in science that have a relativized a priori 
status. Putnam writes: 
My account does not deny – indeed it affirms – that there is a distinction between 
truths which are a priori relative to a particular body of knowledge and truths 
which are empirical relative to a particular body of knowledge. What it denies is 
that there are truths which are a priori relative to . . . the context of ‘all contexts’. 
The context of ‘all contexts’ is no context at all. (Putnam, 1979b, p. x) 
Elsewhere, Putnam (1962a, 1962b, 1976, 1978, 1994a) has characterized the status of 
these principles as “contextually a priori”, “necessary relative to a body of knowledge”, 
and “quasi-necessary relative to a conceptual scheme”. However this distinction is 
presented, Putnam’s approach to apriority is characterized by a rejection of absolute a 
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priori truths, and an affirmation of relativized a priori truths in science. Putnam has 
presented this “moderate Quinean” position as an account of contextual apriority: 
 [My position] . . . does not deny that there at least appear to be a priori truths, it  
does not deny that certain truths have a special status, it tries to explain why that  
is so. . . . The idea is that we can grant that certain truths . . . have a special status, 
but that we don’t have to concede that that status is good old-fashioned apriority. 
The status these truths and falsehoods have, as long as they have it, is contextual 
apriority: apriority relative to the body of knowledge. . . . What still seems to me 
to be right about this is the idea that there is such a status as contextual apriority, 
and the idea that contextual apriority has sometimes been mistaken for absolute 
apriority, i.e., for the status that a statement has if . . . it could never be rational to 
revise it. (Putnam, 1978, p. 99, emphasis added) 
In endorsing this deflationary account of apriority, Putnam’s analysis bears similarity to 
some recent accounts of apriority defended by philosophers of science (e.g., Friedman, 
2001; Stump 2002), a topic that I subsequently address.3  
 Putnam’s analysis is somewhat confusing due to his idiosyncratic usage of terms 
such as “analytic”, “a priori”, and “necessary” (e.g., see Putnam, 1962a, 1962b, 1976, 
1994a). For the sake of clarity and consistency, I will hereafter use “framework 
principles” to refer to what Putnam characterizes as scientific principles that possess a 
relativized a priori or necessary status. Putnam’s retention of these older philosophical 
                                                 
3 Putnam’s account also bears similarity with the older formulation of theory change in physics proffered 
by Hans Reichenbach ([1920] 1965). Putnam studied physics and geometry with Reichenbach and, in 
conversation, Putnam has acknowledged that his account of apriority is “very similar” to Reichenbach’s 
neo-Kantian treatment of apriority (cf. Putnam, 1994b, p. vii). Putnam has also indicated that when he 
wrote his analyses of apriority in the 1960s and 1970s, he had not yet read Reichenbach’s 1920 book. 
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terms, I think, stems from the fact that he wants to salvage and explicate what he regards 
as a real distinction in natural languages that has traditionally marked certain classes of 
statements as “a priori” or “analytic”. That is, the statements that Putnam identifies as 
framework principles approach what have traditionally been given an “a priori” or 
“analytic” status. On this reading, Putnam’s account should be regarded not only as 
clarifying the a priori-a posteriori (or analytic-synthetic) distinction in natural languages, 
but replacing these older formulations with a workable distinction. 
 Framework principles are given a special epistemological status in Putnam’s 
account. As indicated above, these principles possess a necessary or a priori status 
relative to a conceptual scheme, as opposed to a contingent or a posteriori status. 
Retrospectively, Putnam (1994a) explains this distinction as follows: 
[C]all a statement empirical relative to a body of knowledge B if possible 
observations . . . would be known to disconfirm the statement . . . Statements 
which belong to a body of knowledge but which are not empirical relative to that 
body of knowledge I called “necessary relative to the body of knowledge.” . . . 
The point of this new distinction was . . . to emphasize that there are at any given 
time some accepted statements which cannot be overthrown merely by 
observations, but can only be overthrown by thinking of a whole body of 
alternative theory as well (p. 251, emphasis in original). 
Putnam qualifies this distinction by stating that framework principles should properly be 
characterized as “quasi-necessary relative to conceptual scheme” given the abnormality 
of calling potentially false statements “necessary” or “a priori” (whether these statements 
are contextualized or not).  
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 Putnam stresses that his account of framework principles is not simply meant to 
identify principles that scientists are psychologically unwilling to give up. As Putnam 
(1994a) puts it: 
 I would . . . emphasize the nonpsychological character of the distinction by  
pointing out that the question is not a mere question of what some people can 
imagine or not imagine; it is a question of what, given a conceptual scheme, one 
knows how to falsify or at least disconfirm. Prior to Lobachevski, Riemann, and 
others, no one knew how to disconfirm Euclidean geometry, or even knew if 
anything could disconfirm it. (p. 251, emphasis added) 
Putnam’s account identifies a distinction between principles that cannot presently be 
disconfirmed by available methods and evidence, on the one hand, and principles that can 
be presently disconfirmed by observations. This feature of Putnam’s account is meant to 
explain why it was rational for scientists (e.g., in the era of Newtonian mechanics) to 
regard framework principles (e.g., Euclidean geometry) as immune to revision. The 
rationality of this belief is explained by the fact that scientists did not possess the 
requisite theoretical background necessary to disconfirm those framework principles. For 
this reason, Putnam claims that – from a epistemological point of view – framework 
principles possess a “quasi-necessary” status.  
 
4. The Contemporary Relevance of Putnam’s Analysis 
In the remainder of this paper, I examine Putnam’s account of framework principles in 
relation to some contemporary accounts of analyticity and apriority in science. 
Specifically, I compare Putnam’s account to the accounts of Michael Friedman (1997; 
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2001), David Stump (2003), and William Wimsatt (1987; forthcoming). The aim of this 
comparison is to further clarify the nature of Putnam’s framework principles, and to 
examine some issues that are not directly addressed by his analysis. Specifically, I 
examine whether Quinean entrenchment is an essential feature of a priori principles in 
science, arguing – against Putnam and Wimsatt – that it is not.  
Michael Friedman is the most well-known contemporary writer who has 
emphasized the importance of relativized a priori principles in science. In a number of 
works, Friedman (1997, 1999, 2001) has argued that the history of physics demonstrates 
that relativized a priori principles have been central in the formulation of physical 
theories.4 On a general level, Putnam and Friedman’s accounts of the relativized a priori 
are remarkably similar insofar as they both affirm the existence of a priori principles in 
science that are both revisable and relativized to a particular body of knowledge. On a 
more specific level, however, Friedman provides a more detailed and comprehensive 
account of the history of physics.  
In his most developed account of apriority, Friedman (2001) argues that physical 
theory can be distinguished into three asymmetrically functioning parts (pp. 79-82): 
(1) A mathematical part (mathematical/ geometrical principles) that includes 
basic mathematical theories that are employed to describe the spatio-temporal 
framework. 
(2) A mechanical part (coordinating principles) that functions to set up a 
correspondence between the mathematical part [1] and empirical part [3].  
                                                 
4 For a more comprehensive discussion of Friedman’s (2001) conception of relativized a priori principles, 
see DiSalle (2002), Richardson (2002), and Lange (2004).  
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(3) An empirical part (empirical/ physical principles) that uses the theories in the 
mathematical part [1] to formulate empirical laws [3] that describe concrete 
phenomena. 
According to Friedman, in the context of any physical theory, both the mathematical 
principles and coordinating principles are relativized a priori in the sense that – taken 
together – they are constitutive of the empirical part.5 In Newonian mechanics, e.g., 
Euclidean geometry [1] and the Newtonian laws of motion [2] are relativized a priori 
insofar as they are constitutive of empirical laws such as the law of universal gravitation 
[3]. In special relativity, the geometry of Minkowski space-time [1] and the light 
principle [2] are relativized a priori insofar as they are constitutive of empirical laws such 
as Maxwell’s equations for the electromagnetic field [3]. In general relativity, the theory 
of (semi-) Riemannian space-time manifolds [1] and the principle of equivalence [2] are 
relativized a priori insofar as they are constitutive of empirical laws such as Einstein’s 
equations for the gravitational field [3]. 
 The significance of mathematical and mechanical principles, for Friedman, is the 
constitutive function that they serve. Friedman (2001) writes: “What characterizes the 
distinguished elements of our theories is . . . their special constitutive function: the 
function of making the precise mathematical formulation and empirical application of the 
theories in question first possible” (p. 40, emphasis in original). For Friedman, relativized 
a priori principles are required to raise the very possibility of objective (i.e., 
                                                 
5 While both the mathematical and mechanical parts, on Friedman’s account, are relativized a priori, 
Friedman’s (2001) picture suggests that the mathematical part is more fundamental (or, “more a priori”) 
than the coordinating part insofar as the latter presuppose the former, e.g., ‘f = ma’ could not have been 
formulated without the mathematics of the calculus (see Friedman, 2001, pp. 35-7). Friedman’s tripartite 
manner of distinguishing physical theory is helpful for clarifying a way in which a priori principles can be 
differentiated with respect to “degrees of apriority”. This rendering of Friedman’s view, I think, is helpful 
for elaborating Putnam’s “continuum” picture of apriority.  
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intersubjective) empirical laws which can then be tested, e.g., Newton’s description of the 
solar system in book 3 of Principia or Einstein’s calculation of the advance of the 
perihelion of Mercury. In this manner, Friedman highlights a particular functional 
relationship of dependence between a priori and a posteriori principles in the context of 
any physical theory. In particular, Friedman maintains that relativized a posteriori 
principles of a theory presuppose, as necessary background assumptions, relativized a 
priori principles.6  
 A curious difference between Putnam and Friedman’s accounts is that Putnam 
formulates his analysis through Quinean insights, whereas Friedman formulates his 
account in explicit opposition to the sort of Quinean web-of-belief holism endorsed by 
Putnam. For instance, Friedman (2001) argues that the history of mathematical physics 
indicates that: 
. . . entrenchment and resistance to revision are not appropriate distinguishing 
features [of scientific knowledge]. . . . What characterizes the distinguished 
elements of our theories is . . . their special constitutive function . . . In this sense, 
the relativized and dynamical conception of the a priori . . . appears to describe . . 
. conceptual revolutions far better than does Quinean holism (p. 40). 
Friedman argues that Quine’s holism obscures the functional relationship of dependence 
that obtains between different statements within a particular body of knowledge, viz., a 
posteriori principles and the relativized a priori principles that are constitutive of them. 
This places Friedman in direct opposition to Putnam’s characterization of analytic 
                                                 
6 Friedman’s formulation is, I believe, amenable to Putnam’s (1994a) presentation of framework principles 
as being ‘necessary relative to B’ as opposed to ‘empirical relative to B’ (p. 251). What is not emphasized 
in Putnam’s account, however, is the asymmetric functional relation of dependence that Friedman stresses 
between ‘statements necessary in B’ and ‘statements empirical in B’. 
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principles as “resistant to revision”. Against the idea that relativized a priori are 
accurately characterized as entrenched or resistant to revision, Friedman points out that 
when Newton formulated his universal law of gravitation, the new calculus was itself 
controversial (i.e., since it lacked a consistent formulation). Similarly, when Einstein 
formulated the general theory of relativity, neither the Riemannian theory of manifolds 
nor the principle of equivalence were deeply entrenched principles (Friedman, 2001, pp. 
39-40). This suggests that as a characteristic of a priori principles, “entrenchment” may 
be a characteristic that is independent from the precise constitutive role that Friedman 
attributes to these principles.  
 Drawing on Friedman’s work, David Stump (2003) has articulated an account of 
conventions as “functionally a priori”.7 Stump’s analysis is helpful for clarifying the 
aforementioned issue of a priori principles as entrenched versus serving a constitutive 
role. Stump (2003) writes: 
[S]ome elements of our physical theory have a unique epistemological status – 
one must adopt these elements in order to begin empirical inquiry. They therefore 
function as an a priori part of our physical theory that is chosen for conceptual or 
pragmatic reasons, prior to any empirical testing. Though I am willing to concede 
to Quine that these conventions are ultimately empirical, the picture of knowledge 
is very different from . . . Quinean holism in that categories of knowledge can be 
differentiated. While Quine admits that some elements of empirical theory are 
much less likely to be revised than others, he underestimates the asymmetric 
relation between the “hard core” and the “periphery”. It is not just that the 
                                                 
7 Although Stump argues that “conventions” have a functionally a priori status, he emphasizes that these 
conventions are ultimately chosen on the basis of empirical considerations (cf. Putnam, 1962a, pp. 239-42). 
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periphery is more likely to be revised than the hard core, but rather that the 
statements of the periphery cannot even be stated, let alone tested, without the 
hard core functioning as an a priori in the Kantian sense as a necessary 
precondition (p. 1150, emphasis added). 
Like Friedman, Stump believes that Quine’s holistic picture of theory change is 
misleading insofar as it obscures the constitutive role that a priori principles serve within 
a particular conceptual scheme. Although Quine grants that certain beliefs are located at 
the periphery of the “web” and more likely to be revised (e.g., beliefs about biology), 
while other beliefs (e.g., logical laws) are more central and less likely to be revised, 
Quine’s web-of-belief conception of theory change does not appear to have the resources 
necessary to account for the constitutive function that Friedman and Stump have 
identified as the most important distinguishing feature of a priori principles. For 
Friedman and Stump, to characterize these principles as merely “entrenched” misses the 
point.  
  In two papers, William Wimsatt (1987, forthcoming) has proffered a naturalistic 
account of apriority in science.8 Like Putnam, Wimsatt adopts a broadly “Quinean” 
stance, characterizing “analytic” principles as being (1) “unfalsifiable”, and (2) 
“polyfunctional”. In stating that analytic statements are unfalsifiable, Wimsatt suggests 
that certain scientific principles are “highly resistant to revision” or “entrenched”. Like 
                                                 
8 Although Wimsatt presents his analysis as a way of understanding the analytic-synthetic distinction, in 
conversation he has said that his account is also applicable to the a priori-a posteriori distinction. 
Wimsatt’s analysis is presented in the context of his theory of “generative entrenchment” (see Wimsatt, 
2001). Generative entrenchment is a developmental-evolutionary model intended to model evolutionary 
processes in various domains (e.g., biology, science, and culture). For the purposes here, it is important to 
note that Wimsatt (1987) characterizes “analytic principles” in science as “generatively entrenched” 
structures, meaning that analytic principles play a role in generating other parts of scientific knowledge, 
and they are entrenched in the sense that they have become increasingly stable (or ‘immune to revision’) 
over a period of time. 
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Quine and Putnam, Wimsatt maintains that this resistance is due to the high pragmatic 
cost involved with revising these statements (e.g., the law of non-contradiction) given 
their centrality in a system of knowledge. Thus, the basis for the “unfalsifiability” of 
analytic statements for Wimsatt is pragmatic. In calling analytic principles 
polyfunctional, Wimsatt suggests that these principles are applicable in a variety of 
domains and “portable” in the sense that they can be used in a wide variety of contexts, 
interpreted differently, and used in different forms to describe and predict things about 
diverse systems. 
In articulating his account of analyticity, Wimsatt makes reference to Kuhn’s 
(1970, pp. 182-3) discussion of “fundamental laws” in physics. Wimsatt endorses Kuhn’s 
idea that ‘f = ma’ functions as an analytic statement insofar as it is a “general law 
schema” (rather than an empirical law) that functions to generate empirical propositions. 
That is, ‘f= ma’ functions as a “general guide” for translating and generating empirical 
laws in a variety of theoretical contexts. In this precise sense, Wimsatt maintains that ‘f = 
ma’ possesses a “quasi-definitional” status. In explaining how such principles acquire 
such a status, Wimsatt writes: 
The path from generative entrenchment to polyfunctionality to abstraction, to the 
resultant schematic character of such propositions, to their increased 
unfalsifiability and portability . . . is the main path [through] which an [initially] 
empirical generalization acquires a quasi-definitional status. It may now be 
regarded as a truth in meaning, and in formalizations of the theory, it may be 
treated as an analytic proposition (Wimsatt, 1987, p. 12, emphasis added). 
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Here, Wimsatt outlines a process whereby an initially empirical theory becomes 
transformed into a portable tool of analysis, which acquires a quasi-analytic status (also 
see Wimsatt, forthcoming; cf. Friedman, 2001, pp. 88-9). For the purposes here, I want to 
bring attention to Wimsatt’s emphasis on the generative function of analytic or a priori 
principles. On Wimsatt’s account, a priori principles are generative heuristics that can 
subsequently be applied in a variety of contexts.  
Wimsatt’s analysis of analyticity is particularly interesting for its discussion of 
“analytic” principles in the context of theories of biology. For instance, Wimsatt argues 
that Richard Lewontin’s (1970) formulation of “Darwin’s principles” serves as a good 
example of analytic principles insofar as these principles function schematically to 
provide a general framework for understanding evolution for various “units of selection”. 
Lewontin (1970) presents these principles as three conditions that an evolutionary system 
must fulfill in order for change to occur (p. 1): 
(1) Phenotypic variation: different individuals in a population have different 
morphologies, physiologies, and behaviors. 
(2) Differential fitness: different phenotypes have different rates of survival and 
reproduction in different environments. 
(3) Fitness is heritable: there is a correlation between parents and offspring in the 
contribution of each to future generations. 
According to Wimsatt, the formulation of these principles as such is the result of a 
process of analysis, generalization, and abstraction, wherein an initially empirical theory 
(viz., Darwin’s theory of natural selection) has been transformed into a portable tool of 
analysis that can be applied in a variety of contexts. For this reason, Wimsatt thinks that 
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Darwin’s principles have acquired a quasi-definitional status. As another example from 
biology, Wimsatt suggests that even diagrams, such as August Weissman’s diagrams that 
were used to represent the continuity of the germ plasm and the causes of somatic 
differentiation can be regarded as having a quasi-analytic status insofar as these diagrams 
were subsequently applied to indicate corrections in both Weissman’s and competing 
views. 
 
5. Apriority, Constitutive Principles, and Entrenchment 
In the following section, I want to briefly address some issues raised in the previous 
section. In particular, I examine the relationship between apriority, the constitutive 
function of scientific principles, and entrenchment. Like Putnam, all of the philosophers 
discussed above provide accounts of relativized a priori principles. Moreover, all of these 
writers have agreed with Putnam’s idea that these principles possess a “necessary” or 
“quasi-necessary” status. Friedman and Stump’s analyses elaborate this role more 
precisely in the idea that a priori principles serve a (neo-Kantian) constitutive function. 
Wimsatt’s analysis suggests further that these principles can be regarded as generative 
heuristics that can subsequently be reapplied in various contexts. While Putnam and 
Wimsatt claim that a feature of a priori principles is their resistance to revision (or 
entrenchment), Friedman and Stump argue that that entrenchment is not an essential 
element of apriority. 
 Friedman and Stump’s analyses of apriority suggest (contra-Putnam and 
Wimsatt) that Quine’s notions of “entrenchment” and “resistance to revision” are 
inappropriate characteristics to attribute to a priori scientific principles. I think that 
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Friedman and Stump are correct. As we have seen, Putnam argues that relativized a 
priori principles are “highly resistant to revision” because – in a given historical context 
– there are no possible experiences that could falsify those principles (and this is a claim 
that Friedman and Stump would accept). However, this “quasi-necessary” characteristic 
of a priori scientific principles needs to be clearly distinguished from the high pragmatic 
cost that is associated with revising such principles (which I take to be the central idea in 
Quine’s notion of entrenchment). This stance recognizes that the crucial constitutive 
methodological function that these principles serve needs to be separated from the issue 
of how willing scientists would be to give up or revise these principles (regardless of the 
rationality of such beliefs). On this picture, one would expect relativized a priori 
principles that have been highly successful, effective, and useful (e.g., the laws of logic, 
the principles of Euclidean geometry, ‘f = ma’, Darwin’s principles of natural selection) 
to also be characterized by greater resistance to revision or entrenchment. Moreover, such 
successful a priori principles would be akin to the generative structures discussed by 
Wimsatt that have acquired a quasi-definitional status. For the purposes here, I want to 
emphasize that the constitutive function served by framework principles needs to be 
clearly separated from the issue of whether these principles are entrenched.  
 Furthermore, I would argue against the very usefulness of Quine’s web-of-belief 
metaphor, which characterizes highly entrenched scientific principles, lying at the core of 
the web, as being fundamentally non-testable assumptions. Consider the example of 
Avogadro’s number (i.e., the number of molecules in a mole of any substance: 6.022 × 
1023). In Quine-speak, Avogadro’s number is a ‘deeply entrenched’ principle. On the 
other hand, it is quite clear – in contrast to Quine’s web-of-belief picture – that 
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Avogadro’s number is highly susceptible to empirical testing. In fact, in the early 
twentieth century, Jean Perrin ([1913] 1923) identified thirteen independent methods by 
which Avogadro’s number had been experimentally ascertained, e.g., Perrin’s 
experimental work on Brownian motion, Rutherford’s study of radioactivity, and 
Planck’s work on blackbody radiation.9 What the case of Avogadro’s number 
demonstrates, I think, is that Quine is mistaken to suggest that an essential feature of 
highly entrenched principles is their empirical untestability. Accordingly, I think that one 
ought to resist the temptation of translating the constitutive function of a priori principles 
into the language of Quine’s web-of-belief view (cf. Stump, 2003).  
 These observations on entrenchment motivate an argument against conflating the 
constitutive function of a priori scientific principles with the entrenchment of such 
principles. According to the analysis given here, a central feature of a priori principles is 
the constitutive function that they serve: in the context of any given theory, these 
principles serve as necessary presuppositions for framing empirical experiments, and are 
not themselves testable. What is significant is that relativized a priori principles stand in 
an asymmetric relation to the a posteriori principles in the theory (with the latter 
presupposing the former).  Accordingly, these principles are regarded as having a quasi-
definitional status in a conceptual scheme, and in this precise sense, are “prior to 
experience”. This constitutive feature of a priori principles, however, needs to be clearly 
separated from the issue of whether these principles are entrenched. While it stands to 
reason – as suggested by Wimsatt’s analysis – that in order to acquire a definitional status 
                                                 
9 For discussion of Perrin’s analysis of Avogadro’s number, see Nye (1972) and Salmon (1984, ch. 8). In 
his classic treatment, Wesley Salmon presents Perrin’s work as an argument for the reality of atoms and 
molecules that utilizes a common-cause principle.   
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such principles need first to be deeply entrenched, this is not always the case, e.g., as in 
the case of the calculus when Newton formulated his universal law of gravitation. What 
can be said is that entrenchment is one of the typical historical paths by which a scientific 
principle comes to acquire a quasi-definitional status. As such, entrenchment is not an 





In examining Putnam’s account of apriority, and comparing his account to more recent 
accounts, my aim was to arrive at some substantive conclusions regarding the nature and 
role of a priori knowledge in science. One of the main issues addressed in this paper 
concerned the question of whether it is appropriate to characterize a priori principles as 
constitutive or entrenched. I argued that these two characteristics need to be carefully 
distinguished, and in light of Putnam and Wimsatt’s shared view that a priori principles 
are ‘resistant to revision’, I argued that only the constitutive function represents an 
essential feature of a priori scientific principles. 
By way of conclusion, let me briefly summarize what I regard to be the 
fundamental features of a priori scientific principles. First, in the context of any given 
theory, a priori principles are constitutive of the empirical parts of a theory, and can be 
understood as necessary assumptions for framing empirical experiments and laws. As 
suggested by Putnam and Friedman’s analyses, different principles within a body of 
knowledge may possess different degrees of apriority, depending on the level of 
generality associated with the principles in question. Second, regardless of how such 
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principles are introduced (e.g., by stipulation or as the result of abductive inference), a 
priori principles possess a definitional or quasi-definitional status relative to a body of 
knowledge. That is, within a body of knowledge, these principles are regarded as 
definitions. Taken together, these two features constitute the precise sense in which a 
priori principles are “prior to experience”. As argued in the last section of this paper, 
these principles will often display the characteristics of being deeply entrenched or 
resistant to revision, but – as I argued – these are not essential features a priori principles. 
In fact, I would suggest that entrenchment and resistance to revision are derivative 
features of the two central features mentioned above. With respect to the deeply 
entrenched nature of some a priori principles (e.g., Euclidean geometry), this points to 
the fact that deeply entrenched principles often come to acquire a definitional status. Yet, 
it is clear that there are alternative paths by which scientific principles (e.g., non-
Euclidean geometry) can come to possess such a definitional status. With respect to the 
resistance to revision or “unfalsifiability” that Putnam and Wimsatt attribute to a priori 
principles, this may stem from the fact that such principles play such a fundamental and 
central role within the context of a theory that there would be high pragmatic costs 
associated with revising such principles. As argued in this paper, however, it is an error to 
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